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To speak effectively, plainly, and shortly, it becometh the gravity of the profession.
- Sir Edward Coke, 1600
Plain English Statutes and Readability
By Reed Dickerson
Part 1- History, the Problem and the Case for a Statute
In 1965 Reed Dickerson, Professor
of Law at the University of Indiana Law
School, wrote the classic Fundamentals
of Legal Drafting, published by Little
Brown and Co., Boston, a book that has
become the most referred to of all books
on legal drafting. Little Brown and Co.
will soon be publishing Professor Dicker-
son's Second Edition of Fundamentals
of Legal Drafting. With the permission
of the author and the publishers, the
Michigan Bar Journal and the Plain Eng-
lish Committee are pleased to present
excerpts from a chapter in the Second
Edition regarding plain English statutes
and readability.
A Bit of History1
Although it is hard to say when the
complaints against legal language be-
gan, outrage is hardly new. Legal prolix-
ity came under fire as early as 1566.2
Thomas Jefferson took up the cudgel in
1778.3 Jeremy Bentham fumed about
legislative lonq-windedness early in the
19th century. Fred Rodell, writing in
1939, said, "Almost all legal sen-
tences ... have a way of reading as
though they had been translated from
the German by someone with a rather
meager knowledge of English."'
The modem push for clear readable
legal instruments began in the early
1940's following Congressman Maury
Maverick's coinage of "gobbledygook"
and the Office of Price Administration's
first attempts to impose price controls at
the beginning of World War 1I. Finding
that America's small businessmen could
not understand Its regulations without
the intervention of lawyers, OPA en-
gaged Professor David F. Cavers of the
Harvard Law School and Rudolf Flesch
to help the agency communicate more
effectively with the people whose prices
it regulated.
From OPA's experience came a
body of expertise useful in simplifying
regulations and statutes.6 This was im-
proved during the Pentagon's ten-year
post-World War II recodification of the
Nation's military laws7 and later during
the Federal Aviation Agency's recodifi-
cation, in the early 1960's, of the vast
accumulation of regulations relating to
aircraft. Indeed, this expertise, since re-
fined and extended to private legal in-
struments remains useful, even today.
Despite these developments, the
public visibility of the movement to
simplify faded with the war pressures
that supported price control. The result-
ing public passivity went undisturbed,
even by the Korean and Vietnamese
wars, until the explosion of the consumer
movement, which in the early 1970's
turned its attention to instruments that
the typical consumers of goods and serv-
ices are being persuaded to accept: in-
surance policies, product warranties,
and credit documents. At the same time,
many small, relatively unsophisticated
businessmen were being subjected to a
barrage of detailed regulations from
agencies such as the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration and
the Environmental Protection Agency.
As a result, public pressure to simplify
legal instruments became even greater
than it was during World War II.
Mandating Plain English: First Efforts
The most dramatic development in
the drive to simplify the language of pri-
vate legal instruments came with the
emergence of the "plain English" move-
ment. The first glimmerings came in
1974, when Nationwide Mutual Insur-
ance Co. and Sentry Life Insurance Co.
introduced simplified automobile insur-
ance policies, and in 1975, when
Citibank and First National Bank of
Boston introduced simplified consumer
loan arrangements. 8 The first week in
February, 1977 saw the introduction of
the Sullivan Bill in New York which be-
came law the following year, and Pres-
ident Carter's television "fireside chat"
(replete with rocking chair and cardigan
sweater), which culminated in an execu-
tive order that required plain English in
government regulations.
The first efforts to legislate "plain
language" show widely differing ap-
proaches. New York's Sullivan law,
brain child of a Citicorp lawyer, Duncan
A. MacDonald, protects "consumer" in-
struments, which are defined as residen-
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tial leases or contracts for money, prop-
erty, or services for "personal, family, or
household purposes" and involve
$50,000 or less. The mandated standard
is "plain language," defined as language
"written in a clear and coherent manner
using words with common and everyday
meanings," and "[aippropriately di-
vided and captioned." In case of non-
compliance, the consumer is entitled to
actual damages and a civil penalty of
$50, but not attorneys' fees or court
costs. Defenses include good faith and
full performance. The Attorney General
may bring an action for an injunction or
restitution. Other states have followed
suit.
The Federal government has set a
few, very general standards of clarity and
readability. Under the Consumer Prod-
uct Warranty Act, for example, the Fed-
eral Trade Commission has, by regula-
tion, required that written consumer
product warranties set forth specified
items of information "in simple and
readily understood language." The
Truth in Lending Act and its supplemen-
tary Regulation Z require that the disclo-
sures required by that Act be made
"clearly and conspicuously." Neither of
these examples has much to offer in the
present context. A more useful guideline
appears in the Employee Retirement In-
come Security Program: "The summary
plan shall be written in a manner calcu-
lated to be understood by the average
plan participant."
Stating the Problem
What is the best way to solve the
problem? First, we have to understand
it. This involves, among other things,
knowing how lawyers got into this mess.
The traditional explanation has been
that every discipline needs its own tech-
nical terms, some of which may be
meaningless to outsiders. It is also true
that many legal terms have perfectly
adequate "plain English" equivalents
and some matters need not be as com-
plicated as they at first seem. Here, a
good case for simplification can be
made.
Unfortunately, drafting tradition re-
tains the heavy flavor of now-extinct
conditions that prevailed for a long
period beginning in 1487, when drafting
by the judiciary ended.
Legislative gobbledygook appar-
ently reached its peak in the eighteenth
century, a peak so high that even the
massive statutory reforms that Bentham
generated early in the nineteenth cen-
tury have not succeeded in leveling it.
As a consequence, lawyers have
long been enmeshed in an accumulation
of outworn forms that they have been
reluctant to revise if the forms have been
adjudicated in court, and unable to re-
vise if they do not understand them,
which is often the case. A thorough purg-
ing of offending forms would be a happy
event.
But do we need a law?
The Case for a Statute
The idea of legislating the specifics
of good writing is, for professional
draftsmen, highly repugnant and not
merely because most of the people who
have been writing these laws have failed
to get an adequate handle on the princi-
ples of clear communication. It is desir-
able not to tie the hands of draftsmen
who need elbow room.
A normal first reaction to the Sulli-
van law was that, while a minor political
miracle, it was naive, inadequately
framed, and unenforceable. Many mem-
bers of the Bar still think so. But they
may be missing the main point. Despite
its weaknesses, it dramatically sym-
bolizes the current public distaste for in-
eptly crafted laws, regulations, and con-
sumer instruments, and the failure of the
legal profession to keep abreast of mod-
ern planning needs. Although the Bar is
beginning to wake up (along with some
law schools), the pace has until recently
been glacial.
The main value of the plain English
laws appears to be symbolic. Although
New York's Sullivan law is probably (in
any serious sense) unenforceable be-
cause of its "good faith" defense (most
bad draftsmen operate in good faith),
the results that it seems to have helped
to produce in that state are impressive.
Decently readable insurance policies
and warranties are now common.
To accelerate this trend, the or-
ganized bar (and indirectly the law
schools) needs a similar legislative jolt in
other states, which can be delivered
without seriously compromising the
principles of good draftsmanship. Be-
cause a highly developed expertise for
simplifying legal instruments already
exists, it is time that it be put to more
effective use.
And so, a modest case can be made
for a law to help the legal profession
overcome its present, partly justifiable
inertia. Without it, the organized bar is
unlikely to initiate effective action to im-
prove the clarity and readability of legal
instruments.
Some Reservations
One problem is that the "plain Eng-
lish" ideal, if not carefully focused, can
be seriously off the mark. "Plain English"
is in many legal contexts anything but
plain. Besides, the concept suggests that
there is an ideal way to say things that
will fit all legal audiences.
Because legal audiences differ
widely, the draftsman should be permit-
ted to adjust his focus accordingly. On
the other hand, no great harm is in-
volved if such a law focuses solely on
professionals who deal with unsophisti-
cated consumers, where mandating a
higher level of understandability makes
some sense. It makes less sense if the
effort is spread over a wider base within
which audiences differ materially.
Judge Harold Leventhal's observa-
tion that simplifying private instruments
would make it harder to charge what
they are worth' 0 is relevant but not per-
suasive. His explanation too readily be-
comes an excuse for the status quo,
which is deplorable. The answer is that
in most cases the matter can be handled
by educating the client, preferably in ad-
vance, about what is involved. This will
head off most of the unpleasant surprises.
Terms of Art
Another basis for skepticism has
been the generally acknowledged neces-
sity of honoring legal "terms of art." This
is a problem for a legal term only if there
is no usable replacement.
What is a legal "term of art?" Mel-
linkoff says that it is a "technical word
with a specific meaning."" 1 A technical
meaning, of course, is likely to be un-
familiar to the general public. But the
determining factor, he says, is "specific-
ity," which he equates with "precision."
But if unique aptness is not the de-
termining factor, where is the problem?
If Mellinkoff is right, the concept of "term
of art" is here irrelevant. Semantic pre-
cision is not the ultimate, or even main
goal in drafting, and its presence does
not guarantee suitability. The appropri-
ate measure of aptness is, rather, the
draftsman's substantive mission, for
which generality and even vagueness
are often preferable. The Sherman Act
is the classic example.
Mellinkoff's definition of "term of
art" may look like a paraphrase of the
definition in Webster's Third Interna-
tional Dictionary ("a word or phrase hav-
ing a specific signification in a particu-
lar ... department of knowledge"), but
it is not. Because "specific" is closer to
"special" than to "precision" and "sig-
nification" refers, not to the concept, but
to the relation between it and its tech-
nical name, the gist of "term of art"
would seem to be its uniqueness for
practical use.
Ironically, Mellinkoff supports this
view of semantic precision by many of
his own examples. "Laches," "com-
parative negligence," "merchantable,"
"tort," and "stare decisis," which he lists
as legitimate "terms of art," are all highly
general and highly vague. 12 Precision is
not the problem. The problem is irre-
placeability: To what extent is the
draftsman stuck with technical legal
terms that are unfamiliar to the general
public? Mellinkoff associates terms of art
with irreplaceability in his questionable
contention that the greater its precision
("sharpness") the greater the chance
that a term "has no synonym in ordinary
English."',3 Many of his non-specific
terms of art likewise have no equivalent
in plain English. The importance of irre-
placeability is hard to avoid.
What we are really concerned with
in legal drafting is otherwise apt, but gen-
erally unfamiliar, language for which no
familiar language is a suitable substitute.
This may mean suitable in law or suitable
in fact. As an example of the former, the
law might permit only one way of ex-
pressing an idea. A classic example is
D'Arundel's case, 14 which held that if a
person wanted to convey land in fee sim-
ple, he had to say "to A and his heirs."
No substitute, no matter how clearly
synonymous, would do.
A modern counterpart is Section 3-
104(1)(d) of the Uniform Commercial
Code, which provides that to be nego-
tiable, a note must "be payable to order
or to bearer." This means that it must
say "order" or "bearer." Although mod-
ern law contains little of this kind of man-
dated legal suitability, the draftsman
must remain alert to the danger.
What about factual suitability?
Here, we are talking about a term that
refers to a body of law and for which
there is no useable substitute with equiv-
alent legal connotations. Examples are
"surrender" (of a lease), "merchant-
able," "unconscionable," and "venue."
Until a suitable synonym appears, there
is no practicable alternative to using the
accepted term or perhaps creating equiv-
alence by express definition. Example:
"In this policy, the term 'legal cause'
means proximate cause." Here, it is safe
to use "legal cause" throughout the rest
of the instrument without losing the
benefit of the established legal connota-
tions of "proximate cause." Unfortu-
nately, in this instance, the definition
would not be very helpful. In many
cases, the only other acceptable alterna-
tive is a supplementary explanation or
referral to a lawyer.
In any event, the outer limits of
"term of art" need not concern us. In-
deed, it is unnecessary even to refer to
the concept. The important thing is that
the instances in which the draftsman has
no legal or practicable choice as to how
something may be effectively stated are
few enough to leave him considerable
opportunity to simplify or otherwise im-
prove the language of legal documents.
As for the unavoidable terms, he always
has the option of adding explanatory
material if he believes that it would be
helpful and not unduly cumbersome.
Experience with the Securities Act of
1933 and the recent Truth in Lending
Act shows that the danger of "informa-
tion overload" is a real one.
In any event, technical terms are
not the main source of trouble. As Janice
Redish has pointed out, "The complex-
ity of the sentence structure is a much
greater barrier to understanding...
than the technical vocabulary."'" U
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